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ABSTRACT—Claims that neuroscientific data do not con-
tribute to our understanding of psychological functions
have beenmade recently. Here I argue that these criticisms
are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only
one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience.
I provide examples from research on event-related brain
potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our under-
standing of the cognitive architecture of human language
functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible)
contributions from fMRI measurements to our under-
standing of the functional architecture of language pro-
cessing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human
language that integrates information about the necessary
genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer
certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is
evidence from behavior.
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From a sociology of science perspective, cognitive neuroscience
is a tremendous success. In part due to the enormous technical
progress in noninvasive recordings of activity in the living hu-
man brain, a whole industry of research on brain and cognition
has developed. The number of neuroimaging research centers
has grown exponentially over the last decade, as has the number
of publications reporting functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) results. However, this success is not without its
critics. The criticisms follow roughly the following logic: If you
are interested in the genetic and neurobiological infrastructure
underlying and implementing human cognition, that is just fine.
Go ahead and do your research. However (according to the
critics), if you are interested in characterizing human cognition
itself, it does not help to know that ‘‘it happens somewhere north
of the neck’’ (Fodor, 1999). Despite the vast amount of neuro-
imaging studies, theories of human cognition have not (yet)
profited from measuring the brain. The reason can be principled
or practical. The principled reason is that our explanation of the
mind ‘‘abstracts away from the biological realizations of cogni-
tive structures’’ (Block, 1990, p. 261). The relation between
mind and brain is not transparent enough to result in sufficiently
strong constraints for cognitive theories by virtue of our under-
standing of the brain (Fodor, 1974; Page, 2006). The less severe
variant of the critique is that one could potentially derive useful
information from neuroimaging but, in practice, no actual ex-
amples that successfully distinguish between competing psy-
chological theories have been provided.
The first thing to note about this debate is that the critique, at
least implicitly, expresses doubts that cognitive neuroscience is
a fruitful scientific endeavor. In this context, it is surprising that
all of the criticisms focus on fMRI results only (Coltheart, 2006;
Page, 2006; Uttal, 2001). The arguments are thus largely based
on selective shopping in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience.
This toolkit has a lot more to offer than just fMRI; it also includes
event-related brain potentials (ERPs), magnetoencephalo-
graphy (MEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and
measurements of brain structure.Moreover, theories in cognitive
neuroscience are informed by animal models and studies using
single- or multi-unit recordings of action potentials and/or local
field potentials (i.e., measures of neuronal activity at the micro-
scale of brain organization). The general issue is, therefore,
not what fMRI contributes but, rather, how far cognitive neu-
roscience is a viable scientific enterprise using whatever re-
search tools are at its disposal. This is the question that I will
address here, for one particular, central cognitive skill: our ca-
pacity to communicate by means of natural language. But first,
we need to specify the criteria for success.
To establish the criteria that an adequate neurobiology of
language has to meet, we first need to clarify what we take our
explanandum—that is, the thing we want to explain—to be.
If one is interested not only in the cognitive architecture of
language but also in the only machinery that so far has been able
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to instantiate natural language (i.e., the humanbrain), it is obvious
that the bridge between psycholinguistics and neurobiology has to
be crossed. However, it is a valid position to restrict one’s ex-
planandum to the cognitive architecture of language functions. In
that case, the brain facts will only be relevant in so far as they can
be used to develop, select, or constrain a cognitive-architecture
model for the language function of interest. The cognitive archi-
tecture then specifies the levels of representation needed and the
processing steps required for accessing representational struc-
tures and for performing the necessary computational operations
on them. Even in this case, brain facts might be relevant.
One example of a brain fact relevant for cognitive models re-
lates to the nature of the flow of information. Strictly feedforward
models of language comprehension (e.g., Cutler &Clifton, 1999)
predict a fixed spatiotemporal pattern of brain activity that is not
seriously modulated by attention or output-related factors. Such
models are compatible with a serial model of perception and
action, in which a perceptual stage is followed by central cog-
nition (e.g., executive function), which is then followed by ap-
propriate action (cf. Fodor, 1983). One of the arguments for
strictly feedforward systems is that only these will guarantee the
high speed that characterizes many aspects of human cognition.
For instance, we easily recognize and understand three or four
words per second. How would this be possible if all information
that we have in memory about the entities to which these words
refer could, in principle, have an impact on language perception?
Despite the design argument in favor of feedforward models,
recent findings in cognitive neuroscience raise serious doubts
about the general tenability of strictly feedforward serial models.
Certainly, the neural architecture of the human brain supports
feedback options. From all we know now, recurrent loops are a
fundamental characteristic of the mammalian neocortex. All
layers of the cortex are heavily back-connected to earlier regions
in the neural processing chain. Information flow in the brain is,
therefore, not one-way. The cerebral cortex is basically a feed-
back system, and the lack of top-down influences on perception
(informational encapsulation) can thus not be based on the ar-
chitecture of the cortex. This does not necessarily mean that
information flow, in terms of a processing model, cannot be
feedforward. If, under conditions of normal operation, the input
system provides its input to the next level in the processing hi-
erarchy before feedback can have its effect, informational en-
capsulation might still be achieved. However, in this case, it is
speed that buys the system informational encapsulation, rather
than the reverse. Moreover, it is only a soft form of encapsulation
(i.e., not hardwired in the cortex), since with additional time,
feedback will start to have its effect. Importantly, much recent
evidence in cognitive neuroscience suggests that perception is
influenced by the observer’s attentional state, the task, and the
observer’s strategies. These seem to be relevant considerations
for functional-architecture models of human cognition.
An adequate neurobiology of language might thus provide
data that are relevant for cognitivemodels of language functions.
At the same time, the relevant brain facts can only be obtained in
neuroscience research that is guided by state-of-the-art psy-
cholinguistics in terms of theoretical models and experimental
materials. The criteria for an integrated neurobiology of lan-
guage are thus (a) specifications of the neural principles of
language functions that are adequate in relation to behavioral
data and the cognitive architectures derived from these data
(upward adequacy) and (b) specifications of the cognitive ar-
chitectures that are adequate in the light of our understanding of
the principles of brain function (downward adequacy). The un-
derlying assumption is that there is a systematic relation be-
tween cognitive states and brain states. Despite claims made in
the past that these two levels of description and explanation
might not be related in a lawful or transparent way (e.g., Fodor,
1974; Mehler, Morton, & Jusczyk, 1984), many believe that
cognitive neuroscience has made sufficient progress to warrant
this assumption a certain face validity.
Here I give a few examples to indicate where the contribution
to psycholinguistics could be seen for two different methods
used in cognitive neuroscience—namely, ERPs and fMRI.
However, I want to stress that, at the end of the day, it is not a
single method that is going to make the difference.
A FEW EXAMPLES
The recording of ERPs is the oldest and cheapest method in the
toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. ERPs reflect the sum of si-
multaneous postsynaptic activity of a large population of mostly
pyramidal neurons recorded at the scalp as small voltage fluc-
tuations in the electroencephalogram (EEG), time locked to
sensory, motor, or cognitive processes.
Study of the electrophysiology of language started with the
discovery by Kutas &Hillyard (1980) of an ERP component that
seemed especially sensitive to semantic manipulations. Kutas
and Hillyard observed a negative-going potential (a brain wave
with a negative amplitude) with an onset at about 250 milli-
seconds (ms) after a word stimulus appeared on the screen, and a
peak around 400 ms (hence the name N400), whose amplitude
was increased when the semantics of the eliciting word (e.g.,
socks) mismatched the semantics of the sentence context—as in
‘‘He spread his warm bread with socks.’’ Since 1980, much has
been learned about the processing nature of the N400. We know
now that the N400 effect does not depend on a semantic viola-
tion. Subtle differences in semantic expectancy can modulate
the N400 amplitude as well (see Fig. 1; Hagoort &Brown, 1994).
Modulations of the N400 amplitude are generally viewed as
directly or indirectly related to the processing costs of inte-
grating the meaning of a word into the overall meaning repre-
sentation that is built up on the basis of the preceding language
input (Brown & Hagoort, 1993).
A different set of ERP effects has been observed in connection
to the processing of syntactic information. The two most salient
syntax-related effects are an anterior ERP with a negative am-
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plitude (left anterior negativity, or LAN), and a more posterior
ERP effect with a positive-going amplitude, usually referred to
as P600. I will here focus on the P600 (Hagoort, Brown, &
Groothusen, 1993). This effect is triggered by a violation of a
syntactic constraint or a difference in syntactic complexity. If,
for instance, the syntactic requirement of number agreement
between the grammatical subject of a sentence and its finite verb
is violated—for example, ‘‘The boys kisses the girls’’ (see also
sentence 1b below)—a positive shift in the ERP waveform is
observed that starts at about 500 ms after the onset of the vio-
lation and usually lasts for at least 500 ms. An argument for the
independence of this effect from possibly confounding semantic
factors is that it also occurs in sentences where usual semantic/
pragmatic constraints are not present (Hagoort & Brown 1994).
Removing such constraints results in sentences like the fol-
lowing, where one (1a) is semantically odd but grammatically
correct, whereas the other (1b) contains an agreement violation
(marked by the asterisk):
1a. The boiled watering-can smokes the telephone in the cat.
1b. The boiled watering-can smoken the telephone in the cat.
As can be seen in Figure 2, these ERP effects in response to
syntactic processing are qualitatively different from the N400.
Even though the generators of these effects are not yet well de-
termined and not necessarily specific to language, the existence
of qualitatively distinct ERP effects to semantic and syntactic
processing indicates that the brain honors the distinction be-
tween semantic and syntactic processing operations. Thus, the
finding of qualitatively distinct ERP effects for semantic and
syntactic operations supports the claim that these two levels of
language processing are domain specific. That is, the ERP evi-
dence indicates that syntactic computations cannot be collapsed
into a general-purpose language processor, whose internal ma-
chinery does not maintain the distinction between different
types of information (lexical, syntactic, semantic), as suggested
in connectionist models (Tabor & Tanenhaus, 1999).
However, domain specificity should not be confused with
modularity (Fodor 1983). The modularity thesis makes the much
stronger claim that domain-specific levels of processing operate
autonomously without interaction (i.e., informational encapsu-
lation). Although domain specificity is widely assumed in
models of language processing, there is much less agreement
about the organization of the interaction between the different
levels of processing. Recently, new light has been shed on this
issue by a series of ERP studies reporting a P600 associated with
thematic role assignment. In this case, a P600 is elicited when
constraints for grammatical role assignment are in conflict with
thematic role biases. For instance, Kim and Osterhout (2005)
report a P600 to the verb devouring in the sentence ‘‘The hearty
meal was devouring . . .’’, where the first noun phrase is not a
good agent but would be fine as a theme. The fascinating pos-
sibility suggested by these results is that a strong thematic bias
Fig. 1. Modulation of the N400-amplitude event-related brain potential as a result of a manipu-
lation of the semantic fit between a lexical item (either the word pocket or the wordmouth) and its
sentence context (‘‘Jenny put the sweet in her ____ after the lesson’’). The grand-average wave-
form is shown for electrode sitePz (parietalmidline) for the best-fittingword (high cloze; solid line)
and the word that is less expected in the given sentence context (low cloze; dashed line). The
sentences were visually presentedword byword, every 600milliseconds (msec). The critical words
are shown at 600 msec on the time axis. (Negative is up.) Adapted from The Neurocognition of
Language, C.M. Brown & P. Hagoort, eds., 1999, Oxford University Press, p. 281. Copyright
1999, Oxford University Press. Adapted with permission.
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could induce a tendency to detect a grammatical error where
there is none (e.g., ‘‘-ing should be -ed’’) or to assign the gram-
matical role of object to the first noun phrase, whereas the syn-
tactic cues indicate that it is the subject of the sentence. As a
result of this conflict between thematic role biases and syntactic
cues, a P600 results. In this case, semantic factors are so strong
that they seem to impose a syntactic structure onto the input that
is not provided by the syntactic cues themselves. As these re-
sults show, the fact that ERPs provide potentially qualitatively
different effects for qualitatively different processes with a
temporal resolution in the milliseconds range is a distinct ad-
vantage over unidimensional measures such as reaction time
and, to some degree, measuring eye movements during reading.
These and many other results (for further arguments, see
Hagoort & Van Berkum, 2007) are in line with the immediacy
assumption, which states that all available information types are
brought to bear on language interpretation as soon as they be-
come available, without giving priority to the syntax-constrained
combination of lexical-semantic information.
ERP research on language these days is not present only in
cognitive neuroscience journals but also in journals of experi-
mental psychology and psycholinguistics. Being amethod based
on neurophysiological activity in the cortex, ERPs nevertheless
play an important role in guiding and testing purely functional
models of language processing.
Skepticism about the contribution to our understanding of the
cognitive architecture is more substantial for fMRI than for ERPs.
With respect to the language system, this criticism is partly jus-
tified. I had the privilege to review the language abstracts for the
annual meeting of the Organization for Human BrainMapping for
a number of years. Overall, the psycholinguistic quality of the
majority of these submissions is disappointing. The sophistication
in psycholinguistics in carefully controlling for numerous po-
tential confounds in the materials (frequency, familiarity, mor-
phological structure, phonological structure, etc.) and in
addressing issues based on explicit models of speaking, listening,
reading, or writing is often not present in neuroimaging studies on
language. This situation is, however, improving, as it should be.
The lack of psycholinguistic sophistication of many fMRI studies
on language does notmean that there is any principled reasonwhy
fMRI data would be useless for our understanding of the cognitive
architecture of language. Let me give one hypothetical example
that explains the logic of inference. This example provides an
argument against the claim that on the basis of fMRI data nothing
would change regarding our appreciation of the functional ar-
chitecture of language processing (Page, 2006).
Fig. 2. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to visually presented sentences without a coherent
semantic interpretation. A positive-going brain wave (P600/SPS) is elicited by a violation of the
required number agreement between the subject-noun phrase (‘‘The boiled watering-can’’) and
the finite verb of the sentence (smoke). The averaged waveforms for the grammatically correct
word (solid line, ‘‘smokes’’) and the grammatically incorrect word (dashed line, ‘‘smoke’’) are
shown for electrode site Pz (parietal midline). The word that renders the sentence ungrammatical
is presented at 0milliseconds (msec) on the time axis.Wordswere presentedword byword,with an
interval of 600 msec. (Negative is up.) Adapted from The Neurocognition of Language, C.M.
Brown & P. Hagoort, eds., 1999, Oxford University Press, p. 287. Copyright 1999, Oxford Uni-
versity Press. Adapted with permission.
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A few years ago, Kempen (2000) proposed an explicit compu-
tationalmodel of syntactic processing that deals with both syntactic
encoding and grammatical decoding (parsing). For a number of
reasons (such as speaker–hearer alignment during dialog; Garrod
& Pickering, 2004), a common mechanism (in terms of cognitive
resources) for grammatical encoding and decoding is attractive.
Nevertheless, the common-mechanism view goes against the
standard view that assumes separate mechanisms for syntactic
encoding and parsing. To decide empirically between the one- and
two-mechanisms architectures, brain facts might be relevant. For
instance, a common-mechanism view would be hard to reconcile
with neuroimaging data that show a clear segregation of areas ac-
tivated by encoding and areas activated by decoding. Under the
reasonable assumption that a common-mechanism view and a
separate-mechanism view have consequences for the hypothesized
neural organization of grammatical encoding/decoding, brain facts
do contribute to the body of empirical data that might guide the
choice for one cognitive-architecture option over the other.
Apart from contributions of fMRI to our understanding of the
cognitive architecture of language, I expect that we will soon see
more evidence on the consequences for other cognitive functions
from having a symbolic system (language). A striking example is a
recent study from the group of EdmundRolls inOxford (deAraujo,
Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005), showing how the olfac-
tory system can be influenced by language. In an event-related
fMRI study, a test odor was delivered to the subjects. In half of the
trials, the test odor was paired with the verbal label ‘‘cheddar
cheese,’’ in the other half, with the verbal label ‘‘body odor.’’
Subjects rated the same test odor as unpleasant when labeled
‘‘body odor’’ and as neutral when labeled ‘‘cheddar cheese.’’ The
authors found that activation in themedial orbitofrontal cortex was
modulated by the verbal label that accompanied the test odor. The
region where word labels modulate olfactory processing was found
to bewithin theprimary olfactory cortex,wheremain effects of odor
were observed. Thus the activation in the olfactory input system
produced by a test odor could bemodulated by a cognitive marker
provided by simultaneously presented words. This example il-
lustrates something that would not so easily be found out with a
behavioral method: that language information acts directly in the
olfactory input system. In my opinion, such information is highly
relevant for how we construe the architecture of human cognition.
EPILOGUE
I have mainly focused on the contribution of cognitive neu-
roscience to functional models of cognition, particularly lan-
guage. Personally, I am interested in more than this. I would like
to see a neurobiology of language that integrates the genetic and
neural infrastructures necessary for human language with psy-
cholinguistic models of language processing. There are many
questions that can only be answered by measuring aspects of
brain and genome. For instance, which aspects of the neuronal
machinery are shared by language and other cognitive systems?
To what extent are learned language skills such as reading and
writing built on the evolutionary hard-core system of spoken
language? In what way is the neural infrastructure of people
gifted in language (e.g., simultaneous interpreters; people who
speak multiple tongues fluently) different from that of the aver-
age language user? At the same time, it is clear that answering
these questions requires a detailed understanding of the cog-
nitive architecture of the different language skills. Linguistic
sophistication and psychologically motivated fractionations of
complex language functions into their elementary components
are necessary ingredients for asking the right questions about
the underlying neurological and genetic infrastructures. This
is clear from the history of neurolinguistics. The classical Wer-
nicke-Lichtheim theory (1885; see Beaumont, Kenealy, &
Rogers, 1996) about the neural organization of language was
based on the implicit assumption that language consistedmerely
of words. Higher levels of organization such as sentence prosody,
syntax, and semantic interpretation beyond the single-word
level were not part of the Wernicke-Lichtheim framework and
therefore were not examined in terms of the neural organization
of language. Today, based on fine-grained cognitive models of
language processing, the neural organization of language beyond
the single-word level is an active area of research. This proves
how crucial psychological theories are for our understanding of
the brain. The major challenge for the coming decades is to
connect the different levels of analysis and to determine how
their mutual constraint relations are to be understood.
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